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Introduction
Continuation of Colorado’s prosperity obviously requires 
water. Its availability depends on facilitating transfers and 
on minimizing waste.1 Happily, Colorado’s current 
agricultural usage provides a generous pool from which 
underused or wasted water can be drawn. As of 1980, for 
example, agriculture was responsible for 87% of Colorado’s 
consumptive water use.2 Fairly trivial savings in the
1 Throughout the paper I conceive of waste in economic 
terms, i.e., as "a preventable loss the value of which exceeds 
the cost of avoidance." S. L. MacDonald, Petroleum 
Conservation in the United States: An Economic Analysis 129 
(1971). This obviously excludes some water uses that might 
fit the colloquial concept of waste. For example, if water is 
thrown upon the sidewalk in the course of watering, it appears 
to be wasted; but if the cost of avoiding it -- e.g., the use 
of more sprinkler heads, more finely tuned ones —  exceeds the 
value of the water saved, such a use would not be wasteful 
within the economic definition. The fundamental point is that 
all kinds of resources are valuable to a society, so that a 
single-minded focus on saving water will make society worse 
off.
2 U.S. Geological Survey Circular 1001, Estimated Use of 
Water in the United States in 1980 (1983). The 87% figure 
comprises irrigation and other rural fresh-water use (Tables 3 
and 5); the remaining 13* comprises public-supplied fresh­
water, self-supplied industrial water, and thermoelectric 
power consumptive use (Tables 1, 7 and 9).
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agricultural sector could, therefore, provide for a doubling 
or tripling of industrial and municipal consumption. How can 
these savings best be brought about?
The current system is, of course, a mix of market and 
government control, with the market element probably dominant. 
There are quite a few voices raised, however, in favor of 
increasing the regulatory component, in the form, for example, 
of using the "beneficial use" doctrine to mandate water­
saving. These suggestions seem to me ill-conceived. The 
interest in getting the most value out of our water would best 
be served by moving in the opposite direction —  by 
diminishing the current fetters on the market.
The arguments for reliance on the market are the familiar 
ones. Above all, the market is an extraordinary system for 
generating information. Individuals and firms, buying and 
selling in a market, generate prices. Those prices, coupled 
with individual ingenuity, in turn emanl;e people to make 
sensible decisions on how much to consume, how much to 
produce, and how to go about production. Thus a wheat farmer 
is able to decide how much fertilizer he will use, and of what 
types, without knowing anything about how the fertilizer is 
made. But his action in deciding how much to buy (and of 
course those of millions of others) give fertilizer 
manufacturers critical information about how much they should 
produce. And so on backwards through the productive process. 
No government agency could ever pull together the information 
needed to make these decisions.
3
Before discussing Colorado water law itself, let me 
respond in advance to the most common attack on reliance on 
the market in water —  "water is essential to life itself."
First, if the market is a good instrument for allocating 
non-essential resources, one might think that it was all the 
more important to use it for allocating an essential one.
Second, quite a few other elements are essential for 
life. Have you ever tried growing wheat without land? (or 
even practicing law?) Yet on the whole we allow the 
allocation of land to be market-determined. (I’ll return to 
the comparison in more detail later.)
Third, none of the institutions that we discuss here 
today will ever jeopardize —  or even seriously affect -- the 
supply of water for the purposes that make us call it 
essential. Somewhere out in the great western desert there 
may be a person or two about to expire for want of water, but 
that will be because of an extremely local problem —  for 
example, he may inadequately prepared for a camping trip or 
for a journey across a long barren stretch of road. In this 
discussion, by contrast, we are talking as of water as an 
input to agriculture, or to industry, or to non-vital domestic 
uses. Suppose, for example, the domestic price of water were
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to double.3 Lawns might shrink, cars might be cleaned less 
often (or more efficiently), but no one would die of thirst, 
or have to go about dirty, or even have to alter his cooking 
methods.
There a great western tradition of proclaiming water 
essential —  and then adopting institutions that guarantee its 
waste. We could perhaps do better by simply focussing on the 
issue of how to nurture institutions that will diminish waste.
This paper will first try to develop the necessary 
criteria for establishing a market that will secure adequate 
efficiency in the use of surface water. It will then consider 
the special case of instream uses. Finally it will address 
nontributary groundwater.
3 Of course in the part of Denver without water meters, 
the price of water to the user is zero. This is itself a 
curious comment on the reluctance of Coloradans to think 
seriously about water policy. There is powerful evidence that 
residential users’ consumption is highly responsive to price. 
See J. Hirshleifer, J. C. deHaven & J. W. Milliman, Water 
Supply: Economics, Technology and Policy 309 (1960); Zach 
Willey (Environmental Defense Fund), Economic Development and 
Environmental Quality in California’s Water System 35 n. 20 
(Institute of Governmental Studies 1985) (hereinafter cited as 
EDF Report) (referring to evidence that the price elasticities 
of demand are about -0.92 in the urban sector and -0.91 in the 
agricultural sector). A price elasticity of -0.92 means that 
a consumer would reduce his consumption 9.2% in response to a 
10% increase in price.
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A. Criteria.for.Minimizing.Waste.o f  Surface Water
It is my thesis that waste can be adequately prevented by 
giving the holders of water rights conventional market 
incentives to avoid waste. The conditions that would 
establish such market incentives are as follows:
1. Owners o f  water rights w i l l  n o t  waste water if they 
bear the cost of such waste.
For purpose s of the above statement, "cost" me an s 
"opportunity cost.”
2. Owners of water rights will bear the opportunity cost
of w a st e i f  their.rights.are readily transferable.
3. Water rights meet t h e  above test of ready 
transferability .if
a. administrateive/adjudicative costs are kept low;
b . water rights are clearly defined;
c. transfer is restricted o n l y  i n  t h e  interest of
protecting  jun i o r  appropriators; and
d. t h e  adjustments made i n  t h e  interest  o f  protecting 
juniors are t h e  minimu m  c o n s i s t ent w i t h  that protection.
This section will elaborate on these criteria.
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1. Owners of w a t e r  rights will  no t  w as t e  w a t e r  i f  they 
b e a r  th e  c o s t  o f  s u c h  waste.
For purposes of t h e  above statement, "cost” means 
"opportun i t y  cost.”
Suppose a farmer could save4 1000 acre feet of water 
(annually) by means of a device that he can install for $5000. 
(To keep matters simple, assume the device has no operating 
costs and a perpetual life). The opportunity cost of not 
installing the device is the value of the water saved, less 
the cost of installation. If the water saved is worth 
$20,000, then the opportunity cost of the farmer’s inaction —  
the farmer’s waste —  is $15,000.
There are various ways of making the farmer "bear" that 
cost. The state could fine him; it could penalize him by 
taking the water away from him; it could install the device 
and insist on payment from the farmer. None of these methods 
is very consistent with our institutions —  or at least our 
dominant institutions. All of them require that the state 
snoop around, determine that the particular waste-reduction is 
feasible, and bring the weight of its bureaucracy to bear on 
the farmer.
Not only are these methods inconsistent with our 
institutions, they are themselves monstrously inefficient.
How reliable do you think the bureaucrat’s decision —  that it
4 "Save" refers to real savings, i.e., to water 
otherwise lost through evapotranspiration. It does not refer 
to water that seeps out of a ditch and is put to use by 
downstream users.
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is efficient for Farmer A to install such-and-such a device —  
will be?
More basically, determination that a particular practice 
is wasteful requires some device for valuing the water saved; 
unless we know that value, we cannot determine whether the 
extra water is worth the expense. Determining a value for 
water essentially requires the existence of a decent water 
market to generate prices.5
Defects in the water market drive a wedge between between 
a farmer’s and a bureaucrat’s view of sensible water-saving 
methods. The bureaucrat may well value water at its 
incremental cost —  the cost of adding new water supplies 
through dam building, etc. This might amount to, say, $500 
per acre foot. But if the farmer is unable to realize that 
amount for water that is saved, he will clearly compare the 
cost of the savings against a much lower value. In the 
extreme case, where he cannot sell it and he cannot increase 
the yield from his land by increasing water use, he would 
value the extra water at zero.
For precisely this reason, a recent report for the 
Environmental Defense Fund6 takes a fairly skeptical view of
5 In a market individuals and firms create prices by 
their conduct —  indicating by selling that a particular 
quantity of water is, to them, not worth the market price, 
indicating by buying that they have a use that they deem at 
least as valuable as the market price. The ongoing pattern of 
these exchanges keeps driving the price to a level at which no 
further exchanges will provide any benefit; of course new 
developments constantly change people’s evaluation of their 
own circumstances, so that new transactions, and new price 
changes, occur.
6 EDF Report, supra note 3, at 4-5.
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bureaucratic enforcement of the concept of "reasonable and 
beneficial use." It points to a proceeding by the State Water 
Resources Control Board in California, in which the agency was 
valuing water at $200 an acre foot (a very conservative 
estimate of the cost of new water supplies), while the farmers 
in the Imperial Irrigation District were valuing it at the $9 
per acre foot that the district paid. In such a case, the 
opposing parties will be talking at cross-purposes, farmers 
will fight enforcement with bitterness and at great cost, and 
in all probability only the most egregious of waste will be 
ended (if any). The EDF Report concluded that the episode
...illustrated the difficulty of this approach, clearly 
only second best when compared to the establishment of a 
market for water transfers.7
Because of the difficulty of agreeing on values for 
purposes of comparing expenses with water saved, a regulatory 
system for preventing waste cannot work unless accompanied by 
an adequate market. But, as I hope to show below, with an 
adequate market, there is no need for regulatory intervention.
There is, happily, a way of making the farmer bear the 
cost that is entirely consistent with our institutions: 
creation of an adequate market in water rights. With such a 
market, the farmer can quickly recognize that by failing to 
install the device, he is foregoing the $20,000 that the water 
is worth; in our example, he is foregoing a net gain of 
$15,000. (To put in in terms of "opportunity cost,” he in
7 Id. at 4.
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incurring an opportunity cost of $15,000.) That should give 
him ample incentive to install the device.
2. Owners of.water.rights will bear.t h e  opportunity cost
of w a s te  i f  their rights a r e  readily transferable.
With very limited exceptions, the state does not go 
around demanding that a landowner apply his or her land to 
specific uses. It imposes limitations on what he may do 
(zoning), but it does not affirmatively demand that he do 
anything very much. It does not, for example, insist that the 
owner of any parcel of downtown Denver real estate build on 
it.
How is it that the state evidently feels free to allow 
urban landowners to "neglect" their land (in the sense of 
underusing it, of failing to apply it to a beneficial use)?
Is it because Denver real estate is not very valuable? Is it 
because urban landowners are smart and the owners of water 
rights are not?
My answer would be this: Real property law implicitly
recognizes that the owner of urban real estate is disciplined 
by the market. It assumes that if he fails to apply his 
property to the most productive uses, there are plenty of 
people out there who can imagine how they might do so, and 
that he will sooner or later (probably sooner), see their
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bids. He can indulge in the luxury of underuse only at the 
cost of foregoing those bids.8
While Colorado real property law has developed on the 
implicit premise that the land transfer market works well 
enough to discipline neglectful landowners, its water law has 
developed largely on the opposite premise —  that the water 
rights market cannot adequately discipline neglectful water 
rights owners.
Let me offer three samples of Colorado water law 
reflecting this more pessimistic premise: (1) the requirement
of beneficial use; (2) the doctrine of abandonment; and (3) 
the concept that an appropriator does not ordinarily have a 
property interest in the return flow from his use (e.g., he 
cannot ordinarily obtain an injunction against a downstream 
junior whose use would, under prevailing stream flow 
conditions, be impossible without that return flow).
There are a variety of ideas likely to be invoked in 
favor of these rules: First, it may well be said that they
prevent anyone from being a "dog in the manger." Second, they 
might be defended on the ground that, since water is a 
uniquely precious resource, the public interest in efficient 
water use requires state supervision. Thus, in the case of 
beneficial use, the public interest requires that no one use
8 Why, then, are there tracts used only as parking lots 
in downtown Denver? They may seem wasteful. But presumably 
the owners of such land hold off development in the belief 
that such a course will maximize the present discounted value 
of the land. Incidentally, some of them may be wrong, but, 
because they bear the primary cost of any error, we are 
willing to rely on their judgment.
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water for a purpose that the state has not recognized as 
contributing to human well-being. In the case of abandonment, 
anyone who has failed to use his water over an extended period 
might be said to have established by his behavior that his use 
cannot be making much contribution to public well-being, so 
that the public interest requires its termination. In the 
case of return flow, it will be argued that allowing the owner 
to veto uses of his return flow would lead simply to waste of 
water.9
All of these arguments, however, are simply the assertion 
of an implicit premise that the market is not well enough 
developed to put adequate pressure on people either to use 
their water efficiently, or to sell it to one who can. So 
long as the market enables those with good ideas for the use 
of water to bid it away from current owners, there is no 
reason to believe that any of these doctrines is needed to 
assure efficient water use.
I would submit that this gloomy premise about the water 
rights market, if now true, can be changed. The section below 
addresses the criteria that must be met if water rights are to 
be transferable enough so that the market can discipline those 
inclined to waste.
9 A further argument would be that any other rule would 
allow the development of monopoly conditions. That seems to 
me most implausible, except insofar as instream uses are 
concerned. In an watershed where little water has been 
committed to consumptive use, appropriation by merely 
asserting an instream use might well lead to monopoly. The 
problem is treated separately in Part B.
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3. Water rights meet the above test of ready 
transferabili t y  if
a. administrative/adjudicative costs are kept low;
b . water rights are  cle a r ly  defined;
c. transfer i s  restrict e d  o n l y  i n  t h e  inter e s t  of 
protecting junior  appropriators; and
d. the adjustments made in the interest of
protecting juniors a r e  t h e  minimum consistent  w i t h  that 
protection.
Below I will review each of the four subparts of 
these conditions for adequate transferability.
a. Administrative/adjudicative costs a r e  k e p t  low.
Clyde Martz has addressed this point. At least to an 
outsider, his argument that transfers could be eased by 
greater reliance on the administrative process seems 
persuasive.
b. W a t e r  rights a r e  clearly defined. Each of the 
doctrines that I discussed in the first part of this paper 
tends to undermine the clear definition of water rights. The 
concept of beneficial use, for example, means that the vendor 
and vendee of water rights will, at least in some cases, be 
uncertain whether the would-be transferor has any right to 
transfer. Again, let me draw the contrast to the urban land 
market. If A owns a tract that he has used only as a parking 
lot for 15 years, he can clearly sell the area to which he 
initially acquired title, without anxiety that his use in that 
period may be deemed not "beneficial” and thus expose him to a
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claim that he had abandoned his right. Nor will the quantity 
available for sale be reduced on the ground that his "historic 
use" was less than his paper title. But Colorado water law 
creates precisely such gaps between paper title and legally 
transferable right.
c. Transfer.is.restricted only in.the.interest of
protecting junior appropriators. On this point, Colorado law 
conforms to the principles I’ve set out. Unlike some other 
states —  Wyoming comes to mind —  Colorado does not mandate 
an open-ended inquiry into whether the transfer serves the 
public interest. In my judgment, that is entirely correct.
Any broadening of the inquiry would increase the risk of 
disapproval; anything that increases the risk of disapproval 
makes the owner’s expectation of revenues from a sale more 
iffy; and anything that makes that expectation more iffy will 
dull the market’s incentives.
Let me change my earlier hypo a little. Suppose the 
device costs $15,000, so that the net saving is only $5000.
And suppose in the "review" process, a proposal of transfer 
has only a 50-50 chance of passing. At that point the 
prospect of an offer of $20,000 has a value of only $10,000 
(after we’ve adjusted for the chance of defeat).10 (I am 
putting aside the out-of-pocket costs of the review process, 
covered in the first point above.) Any comparable broadening
10 This oversimplifies. Unless the review agency or 
court is hopelesly erratic, it should be possible to identify 
transfers with a good chance of passing, etc. For the 
sentence in the text to be accruate, then, it must refer to a 
particular type of potential transfer with a 50-50 chance of 
getting through the review agency or court.
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of the inquiry that accompanies transfer will have a similarly 
dulling effect of waste-reduction incentives.
Although Colorado does not obstruct transfers except in 
the name of protecting juniors, federal law does so. The 
owner of a Bureau of Reclamation irrigation right, intending 
to sell the right to an industrial water user, is not allowed 
to enjoy the full capital gain. The Bureau conditions 
approval of transfer on its recapturing a substantial portion 
of the original subsidy.11 The principle appears to be that a 
person should not profit unduly from transferring to industry 
a water right that was initially established because of a 
national program in favor of agriculture. I understand the 
principle, but let me state what is involved in a slightly 
different way. The rule requires that a valuable resource be 
wasted —  i.e., held below its most valuable use —  merely 
because a private person would enjoy an unintended gain as a 
consequence.
The country has already been through this issue in 
relation to capital gains. Because of a hostility to 
incidental profits, Congress gradually pushed the effective 
rate up to nearly 50% in the mid-1970s. By 1978, however, it 
recognized the deleterious effects for the country as a whole 
—  the recognition was completely bipartisan —  and sharply
11 See National Water Commission, Water Policies for the 
Future 264-68 ((1973), for a review of Bureau of Reclamation 
policies and recommendations for diminishing the subsidy 
recapture burden. S e e  also Ellis & duMars, T h e  Two-Tiered 
Wetsern Water Market, 57 Neb . L. Rev. 333, 335-49 (1978) 
(reviewing federal discretionary power over transfers of 
project water).
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reduced rates. The Bureau of Reclamation recapture rules 
amount to a surtax on the capital gains derived from transfer 
of such a right; that surtax should be abolished.
My guess is that our representatives in Congress could 
free up far more water for Colorado if they took half the 
energy that they lavish on water projects and instead devoted 
it to the repeal of these rules.
d. The adjustments made in the interest of protecting 
junio r s  ar e  the minimum consistent with that protection.
Here, I think, Colorado law could enjoy some improvement.
It is standard that an appropriator does not have a 
property right in his return flow. He could not, for example, 
obtain an injunction against a downstream junior on the ground 
that, without the return flow from his use, the junior would 
have no water.
Adequate transferability of water seems to me to require 
modification of that concept in the context of water 
transfers. When transfer occurs, the new right (or newly 
reconstituted right) should, I submit, be defined so that the 
owner has a property right in any return flow that would 
otherwise be a windfall to downstream users.
Let me illustrate. Suppose that A has a right to divert 
10 cfs and his use is 50% consumptive. He proposes to 
transfer the right downstream. Suppose it is determined that, 
in order to protect juniors located between the two points of 
diversion, the water right must be cut in half, say from 10
16
cfs to 5 cfs. Further suppose that the new use is also 50% 
consumptive.
Juniors downstream of the new use will, under current 
law, enjoy a windfall. As the new use might have been 100% 
consumptive, they are getting extra security for their rights 
in the form of the 2.5 cfs that the transferor could have used 
himself, but doesn’t.
This transfer is effectively taxed at a rate of 50%, when 
the law reduces the right from 10 to 5 cfs. Enabling the 
owner to enjoy a property right in the return flow —  which 
his action has conferred upon downstream juniors —  would 
offset that penalty. It would thus reduce the negative 
effects on transferability that flow from the protection of 
juniors.12
The standard objection will be made that this would allow 
the transferring party to be a "dog in the manger." It does 
so no more so than does allowing people to own parking lots in 
Denver. If A owns a parking lot, and B has the idea that he 
could put the land to a better use, and therefore starts 
building on it, we don’t say to A: "Oh well, you weren’t
12 See L.M. Hartman & D. Seastone, Water Transfers: 
Economic Efficiency & Alternative Institutions 10-11 (1970), 
for advocacy of this solution.
A more radical concept would be a rule that all 
appropriators have a property right in their return flow.
Under such a rule it would be a rare case where juniors’ 
rights would be adversely affected by a transfer. (This puts 
aside persons using the water as a result of transactions with 
the appropriator whose return flow was involved and who could 
be expected to protect themselves by contract with their 
vendor or lessor.) Institution of such a system at this date 
is clearly impossible because of the massive restructuring of 
rights that it would entail.
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using it adequately, so we’ll let B go ahead.” We let A veto 
B’s intrusion. That is to say, we force B to use a market 
transaction to convince A —  i.e., to bid the land away from 
him. The same principle should, I submit, apply to water that 
is a windfall to downstream juniors as a result of a transfer. 
If he thinks he has a valuable use, let him bid for the water 
from the owner of the transferred right. In the absence of 
monopoly, and with the costs of transfer modest, the risk of 
waste should be minimal.
While this proposal may seem extreme, it in fact already 
applies in the limited area of water imported from another 
basin. In that instance, the importer is regarded as owning 
the return flow from his use.13
In the absence of a water market, direct government 
action to monitor and prohibit waste is doomed. It will 
generate antagonism between farmers and the enforcement 
agency, prolonged and expensive proceedings before agency and 
court; only on very rare occasions, in instances of extreme 
waste, would it actually save any water. With a reasonably 
functional water transfer market, no such direct governmental 
action would be necessary. Water users, with an eye to resale 
of any water savings, would adopt economical water saving 
devices on their own.
Enhancement of the water market in Colorado is a project 
that can unite adherents of the free market, typically located 
on the "right,” and environmentalists, typically located on
13 City & County of Denver v. Fulton Irr. Ditch Co., 506 
P. 2d 144 (Colo. 1972).
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the left. Speaking of water transfer markets, the recent EDF 
Report argues:
Those who hold water rights could generate extra income 
by selling some water, and the water buyers could 
purchase water at prices lower than the costs of newly 
developed water supplies. Pressures to divert additional 
water from natural ecosystems would be reduced, thus 
benefitting the environment.14
Enhancement of the water transfer market establishes a 
game in which everyone can win.
B. Instream  Uses
Instream uses have at best fitted awkwardly into the 
scheme of prior appropriation. Some of the difficulties have 
seemed doctrinal, but there are also some practical 
difficulties in fitting instream uses efficiently into the law 
of prior appropriation.
First I wish to put aside altogether the idea that 
instream uses are in some way inherently inferior or, as they 
have been found in some jurisdictions, non-beneficial.
Governor Lamm has rightly pointed out the enormous 
contribution that instream uses make to the economy of the 
state, attracting fishermen and other vacationers from less 
attractive states. But surely we need not base the beneficial 
character of instream uses on its revenue potential. Even if 
not a dollar changed hands, clearly —  at least it is clear to 
14 EDF Report, supra note 3, at 3-4.
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me —  the aesthetic contribution of water, left alone in the 
stream, justifies its recognition as beneficial. Water in a 
stream, smooth or rippling or cascading over rocks, sunlight 
reflecting from the water, the light patterns on nearby trees 
—  all these are among the things that make life worth living. 
As did one of Shakespeare’s characters, celebrating life 
outside of worldly competition, we can find "books in the 
running brooks... and good in everything.”15
Despite the (to me) unquestioned value of water untouched 
by dam builders, there are real problems in assuring that the 
provision of instream uses does not end up radically 
distorting the total system for allocating water. Instream 
uses have their opportunity costs too. We should strive for a 
system in which water shifts out of instream uses when the 
cost exceeds its true value and into instream use when the 
opposite is true. I see three main problems: (1) risks of
monopoly; (2) so-called free rider problems; and (3) assuring 
that holders of instream rights are exposed to the opportunity 
costs of continued instream use.
Monopoly. Historically, the diversion requirement has 
blocked establishment of instream rights in private persons 
(and, in some cases, even in public entities).16 In a 
watershed where much of the water is unappropriated, the
15 W. Shakespeare, As You Like It, II, 1, 16-17. The 
full passage is:
And this our life, exempt from public haunt,
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in everything.
16 Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Rocky 
Mountain Power Co, 158 Colo. 136, 406 P. 2d 798 (1965).
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application of that rule tends to prevent the monopoly which 
would result from application of the other aspects of prior 
appropriation law (assuming instream uses were recognized as 
beneficial).17 If appropriation without diversion were valid 
at that stage, application of standard prior appropriation 
doctrine (i.e., treating commitment to a beneficial use as 
sufficient to establish a right) would allow a sharp operator 
to acquire an instream right to all the then unappropriated 
flow.
Consequently, until a stream is largely appropriated (and 
assuming continued reliance on prior appropriation as the 
besic device for initial allocation of water rights), 
permitting appropriation by private persons under the usual 
rules would be problematic. Restricting appropriation for 
instream purposes to government entities makes some sense, on 
the principle that such an entity would not seek a monopoly. 
However, one would want to be sure either that its membership 
was truly representative or, perhaps, that its acts became 
final only on legislative approval. Alternatively, one might 
allow private persons to appropriate for instream uses, 
subject to veto by a government review board. Presumably such 
a review board would look with special favor on appropriations 
by organizations permanently committed to instream recreation
17 Allocating rights initially by an auction rather than 
by a user’s application to use would help circumvent this.
See Williams, T h e  Requiremen t  o f  Beneficial U s e  a s  a  Cause  of 
Waste in Water Resource Development, 23 Nat. Res. J. 7, 20 
(1983)..................... . ........
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or to preservation of nature generally (such as Trout 
Unlimited or The Nature Conservancy).
Fr e e  riders. An instream use is likely to be enjoyed by 
individuals that the private owner of an instream right could 
not charge. To take the most obvious case, where a road or
public park borders a stream, people can stop to fish or
picnic or just watch the water. Many of those people would 
doubtless be willing to pay for the use, if the owner of the 
instream right could fence it and collect a fee. But in many 
instances the cost of fencing would be prohibitive in relation 
to the possible fee, and fencing might be undermined by access 
through public land.
Thus people would be able to get a "free ride" on the 
owner’s rights. A well-accepted economic principle is that 
where such free-rider problems exist, the market is likely to 
undersupply the good in question. As entrepreneurs are unable 
to collect the equivalent of full market prices for the good, 
they will not supply it as amply as a good that is not subject 
to such free rides.
Thus, while the monopoly issue would (at least for a 
largely unappropriated stream) lead to excessive commitment of 
water to instream uses, the free rider problem would lead to 
the opposite direction.
There are various solutions here. First, people 
contribute voluntarily to organizations that preserve nature. 
Those contributions —  an implicit private sector recognition
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of the free rider problem —  provide an offset at least to a 
degree.
Second, government can provide a subsidy. It already 
does so by allowing tax deductibility for charitable 
contributions since nature preservation is clearly among the 
permissibile charitable purposes. But that subsidy could be 
increased, for example, by providing matching grants to 
organizations that acquired instream rights for public or 
semi-public use.
Third, government agencies could themselves acquire 
instream rights. As noted above, that is a potential solution 
to the problem of monopoly that would arise if private 
organizations were allowed to appropriate for instream 
purposes when a stream was largely unappropriated. This is, 
of course, the primary solution in the prior appropriation 
states.18
Undervalu e d  opportunit y  costs. Instream uses limit 
possible diversions that are upstream of the point on the 
river where the instream use comes to an end. (This includes 
upstream transfers of pre-existing uses.) A government agency 
charged with holding instream use rights is not likely to be 
very sensitive to these opportunity costs. No matter how 
excellent the water transfer market may work in general, such 
a body will be extremely reluctant ever to relinquish, or 
diminish, an instream use right. Yet the value realized by
18 See generally Tarlock, Appropriation  f o r  Instream 
Flow Maintenance: A Progress Report on "New" Public Western 
Water Rights, 1978 Utah L .  R e v .  2 1 1 .
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the shift of a use upstream is bound sometimes to exceed the 
value of the diminution in the instream use right.
A private organization dedicated generally to preserving 
nature—  The Nature Conservancy, the Audubon Society, etc. —  
seems far more likely to be responsive to bids from competing 
users. It will typically enjoy a broad mandate in the general 
area of nature preservation, so that it will recognize the 
alternative uses of the revenue that partial relinquishments 
may yield. A concommitant will be budget flexibility 
typically lacking in a state agency.
Perhaps the most well known example of this is the 
Audubon Society’s oil and gas leasing in the Rainey Preserve 
in Louisiana. The Society, comparing the potential revenue 
from oil and gas operations (conducted under severe and 
precise restraints), and the good it could accomplish with 
that revenue, with the relatively minor sacrifice of 
environmental quality at the preserve itself, found the 
transaction to be an overall benefit to its mission.19
Such flexibility seems almost unimaginable in a 
government agency. A transaction of that sort would be hailed 
as a "sell-uot" by the agency’s constituency; it would 
probably have to turn the revenue back to the state treasury; 
its personnel would be demoralized by the shrinkage of the 
agency’s turf.
Solutions. The above analysis suggests that the rule 
against appropriations by private persons for instream uses
19 J. Baden & R. Stroup, Saving the Wilderness —  A 
Radical Proposal, 13 Reason No. 3, pp. 28-36 (July 1981).
24
requires modification. A tentative proposal for a legal 
regime for instream use would be roughly as follows: 
o For initiation of rights, private charitable 
organizations dedicated to nature preservation should be 
allowed to make initial appropriations, subject to veto by a 
fairly representative government agency. This rule largely 
solves the risk of monopoly, while opening the door to 
instream holdings by non-state parties.
o Private persons should be free to acquire non-instream 
rights and convert them to instream flow purposes, as such a 
conmversion entails no serious risk of monopoly.
o Subsidies for acquisition of instream rights by private 
charities are suitable as a response to the free rider 
problem, particularly in the form of matching grants or tax 
credits or deductions.
o In general, holdings by private charitable 
organizations should be preferred to state holdings, because 
of their greater responsiveness to opportunity costs. Such 
organizations, so long as they fit a pre-defined class of 
entities committed to nature preservation, should be free to 
sell rights as well as acquire them, and to accept cash or 
other consideration in exchange for reductions in rights when 
those reductions are needed to allow upstream transfers of
consumptive uses.
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C . Nontributary Groundwater
The criteria discussed in Part A are applicable to 
nontributary groundwater. There are three significant 
differences, however: (1) the physical interaction between
users is somewhat different; (2) exhaustion is possible (and,
I would argue, in many cases desirable); and (3) groundwater 
law is not bedevilled by a century of the Rule of Capture.
The third point is perhaps most criticial. For surface 
water law, escape from the Rule of Capture is a virtual 
impossibility. But for nontributary groundwater, the field is 
open.
I am startled that the Rule of Capture should even be a 
serious candidate for a nonrenewable fugacious resource. For 
125 years, the story of oil and gas law has been the struggle 
to undo its ill effects. To use it as the starting point for 
a law on nontributary underground water seems to me to 
disregard that history.
The defects of the Rule of Capture are well known. 
Essentially it generates a race to extract. Putting aside 
some technicalities that are special to oil and gas, that race 
generates two costs: First, it is likely to lead to an 
excessive number of wells, as owners seek to get the oil or 
gas out before fellow owners can. Second, and again for the 
same reason, owners extract at too fast a rate: that is, they
disregard the value that the oil or gas may have in the 
future. They do so for the very good reason that each owner 
has no assurance of being able to get it in the future —  he
may lose it to others if he fails to extract. While private 
property rights normally give an owner an incentive to 
conserve for the future, in order to maximimize the present 
value of the property,20 the uncorrected Rule of Capture 
obliterates that incentive.
When I say that the Rule of Capture remains a candidate 
for nontributary groundwater, I should say explicitly that I 
refer to the proposals of "Subgroup #2" of the Governor’s 
Groundwater Legislation Committee. It is, however, inaccurate 
to refer to their proposals as simply a Rule of Capture.
First, under their proposals, land ownership would not operate 
at all to limit potential extractors. Thus, one of the 
elements that limits the race to extract in oil and gas would 
be absent.
Second, in order to control the race to extract, the 
Subgroup #2 proposals would provide for very broad 
bureaucratic discretion. The state engineer, a revised 
Groundwater Commission, and local management authorities 
would, between them, determine the number and location of 
wells and the rate of extraction. The general idea is that 
waste-prevention must occur entirely through direct 
governmenta l  action. Thus, although the doctrinal basis would 
be different, the premise that merely occupies the periphery 
of surface water law —  the assumption that the market cannot
26
2 0 This is addressed in more detail below.
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impose adequate constraints on neglectful water users21 —  
would become central to nontributary groundwater.
Subgroup #2 dealt in harsh terms with the proposition 
that overlying ownership should determine the right to extract 
and that overlying owners should have an indefeasible right —  
i.e., a right that others cannot destroy by going ahead with 
extraction. Let me briefly consider the Report’s criticisms 
of overlying ownership:
1. The Report argues that the overlying ownership 
criterion is "[1] arbitrary, [2] nonresponsive to optimum 
reservoir development, [3] inflexible where flexibility may be 
needed for optimum water use and [4] possibly unreliable where 
acquifers may have significant tributary characteristics." 
(Report of Subgroup #2, July 24, 1984 ["Subgroup #2 Report"], 
p. 4.) (The characterizations are also applied to the 
statutory 100-year minimum life rule; as applied to that rule, 
they seem correct.)
All these statements [at least the first three] could be 
made about land ownership. What provides the flexibility, the 
responsiveness to optimum use, and the non-arbitrariness, is 
the capacity of owners to make transfers. Those attributes 
can and should apply to water rights based originally on 
overlying ownership.
Basing rights on overlying ownership should, however, be 
only the starting point. Even with such ownership, owners
21 See Part A and its discussion of the doctrines of 
beneficial use, abandonment, and non-ownership of return 
flows, at pp. 10-11 above.
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would have an incentive to drill early in order to extract 
their share before extensive drilling had lowered the water 
level. Accordingly, a system of unitization, comparable to 
the one for oil and gas, should be adopted. Unitization 
should be made easy: agreement of, say, owners of of the
water should be enough for adoption of a unitization agreement 
binding the entire acquifer, and, except for administrative 
review to be sure that the agreement does not inflict serious 
unfairness on opposing owners, no other requirement should 
exist. (By contrast, many oil-and-gas unitization statutes 
condition compulsory unitization on, for example, its being 
necessary for secondary or tertiary recovery operations. No 
extraneous limitations of this sort should be imposed.)
By virtue of unitization, (1) owners can agree on a plan 
that is responsive to market forces but does not involve any 
race to extract; and (2) enjoyment of the beneficial interest 
can rest upon a combination of overlying ownership plus 
contribution to the expenses of extraction, rather than on 
accidents of well location. Such a regime should be available 
for groundwater.
2. The Report argues that under a rule of overlying 
ownership "no basis exists..., outside of a designated 
groundwater basin, for exercising conservation authority with 
respect to depletable sources of supply" or for "establishing 
local management districts to make value judgments on the best 
utilization and conservation of the resource." (Subgroup #2 
Report, p. 5.)
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Again, the Report assumes that a system of private 
property rights cannot induce appropriate conservation. But 
such rights —  if clearly defined, fully transferable, and not 
subject to major externalities —  provide an ample incentive 
to conservation. If an individual owns a resource, he bears 
the opportunity cost of accelerating its extraction. If 
defering extraction will increase its present value, which 
will be true for many supplies if scarcity is expected to 
increase, the profit motive will persuade him to do so.22 
(That is the reason why, for example, in the event of a freeze 
destroying much of the coffee crop, coffee owners withhold 
substantial quantities from the current market; they thereby 
shift coffee supply into the future and balance available 
supplies between current and future use.)
Now if the "local management district" referred to were 
simply an owners’ committee, with representation proportional 
to water ownership, it would be at least analogous to a 
unitization agreement. Since Subgroup #2 rejects the 
ownership concept, however, that clearly is not the basis of
22 It pays to defer extraction of an underground 
resource if the value of the resource in the ground is rising 
at a rate exceeding the interest rate. In practice this means 
that expensive-to-extract reserves are deferred, cheap-to- 
extract ones are taken early. While this may seem an 
imposition on future generations, they would not be better off 
if society artificially held back from consumption of the 
reserves: if their in-ground value is rising more slowly than
the interest rate, then the investments that society is in 
fact making are increasing the wealth available 10, 20 or 100 
years from now more rapidly than would tighter conservation of 
the in-ground natural resource. (This of course assumes that 
the legal regime is not a Rule of Capture, which artificially 
accelerates withdrawal.) For an extended discussion of these 
matters, see Williams, Running Out: T h e  Problem o f  Exhaustible 
Resources, 8 J. of Legal Stud. 165 (1978).
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the proposal. Accordingly, it seems to me that not having 
"value judgments" made by such a committee is entirely 
desirable. In the absence of a serious market failure, there 
is no call for a committee to decide on the use of other 
people’s property.23
3. The Report argues that under the ownership concept 
"the landowner gets unprecedented and unearned bonus for water 
development. The owner of land, as in the oil and gas 
setting, may control access to be sure; but he cannot claim 
economic benefit from the lawful removal of resources from 
under his land. The rule of capture should apply to water as 
to oil and gas to the extent to which the user can put the 
resource to a beneficial use." (Subgroup #2 Report, pp. 6-7.)
First, there is obviously nothing unprecedented about a 
landowner receiving an economic benefit from resources under 
his land, even though he made no contribution to their 
existence. This is exactly what the legal system for oil and 
gas involves, when you combine the common law with 
wellspacing, allowables, and unitization. Nor it is 
unprecedented for water, for the old English Rule of Capture 
limits extraction to overlying owners (or persons acting with 
their consent). And clearly since adoption of Senate Bill 213 
in 1973 [C.R.S. 37-90-137(4)J, effectively giving overlying 
owners a veto with respect to the water under their land in an 
undesignated basin, it has had a precedent in Colorado.
23 Subgroup #2 would in effect generate a very serious 
market failure, by establishing a Rule of Capture, and then 
bring in the bureaucrats to correct it.
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Second, as to the "unearned" character of the bonus, the 
plain fact is that any natural resource generates unearned 
wealth. Economists refer to this value as "economic rent" —  
the difference between the price necessary to elicit 
production of a good and the price that the good can command 
in the market. Thus if water can be extracted at a cost of 
$.25 per acre foot and has a market value of $1 per acre foot, 
it has an economic rent of $.75. Whoever gets that economic 
rent, it is unearned.
For reasons that are not apparent, Subgroup #2 would 
allocate that rent to those who get their proposals past the 
state engineer (and other controlling bureaucracies). Such a 
rule, effectively empowering the state engineer to dole out 
the economic rent, sets off a competition for that value. In 
the course of the resulting conmpetition, much of the value of 
the rent is likely to be to be destroyed. People have an 
incentive to invest large sums of money hiring lawyers and 
hydrologists to make their case before the deciding 
bureaucrat; they will tend to do so up to the point where 
those expenses equal the expected value of the rent (i.e., its 
value discounted by the likelihood of prevailing).24
Putting the economic rent up for grabs —  that is, giving 
a state official the power to allocate it —  generates 
colossal waste. This is quite apart from the waste that is
24 I.e., suppose that the value of the resource is
$100,000 and a claimant estimates his chances as one-in-ten.
He will incline to spend as much as $10,000 trying to persuade 
the agency to allocate the resource to him.
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likely to result from the official’s making erroneous 
decisions.
Thus, denying the overlying owner the economic rent, or 
as Subgroup #2 puts it, the "unearned bonus," leads to 
destruction of that "bonus.” It seems to me far superior that 
it should go to the overlying owner (what’s so terrible about 
him, anyway?) than be destroyed.
Accordingly, a suitable regime for nontributary 
groundwater is ownership in the overlying owner, coupled with 
provisions facilitating unitization of the acquifer, in whole
or in part.
